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Abstract
Background: In the context of interacting activities requiring close-body contact such as fighting or dancing, the actions of
one agent can be used to predict the actions of the second agent [1]. In the present study, we investigated whether
interpersonal predictive coding extends to interactive activities – such as communicative interactions - in which no physical
contingency is implied between the movements of the interacting individuals.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Participants observed point-light displays of two agents (A and B) performing separate
actions. In the communicative condition, the action performed by agent B responded to a communicative gesture
performed by agent A. In the individual condition, agent A’s communicative action was substituted with a non-
communicative action. Using a simultaneous masking detection task, we demonstrate that observing the communicative
gesture performed by agent A enhanced visual discrimination of agent B.
Conclusions/Significance: Our finding complements and extends previous evidence for interpersonal predictive coding,
suggesting that the communicative gestures of one agent can serve as a predictor for the expected actions of the
respondent, even if no physical contact between agents is implied.
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Introduction
Dancing a waltz, playing a piano duet, carrying a table together
are all examples of joint activities requiring a considerable degree of
interpersonal coordination. To successfully engage in these
activities, actors must be able to direct their attention to where
the interaction partner is attending (joint attention) [2,3] and to
adjust their actions to those other persons choosing an appropriate
complementary action to be performed at an appropriate time [4].
Time places serious constraints on joint actions and, as the time
windows for coordination are often very narrow, actors must
achievea closetemporalcoordinationforactingsynchronouslyorin
turns [5]. Similarly, to avoid bumping into one another or into an
obstacle (e.g. when carrying an object together), they need to
effectively distribute a common space and optimize movement
paths. Under these circumstances, the possibilities for moving and
for completing actions are jointly constrained [6]. As dynamical
principles constrain the coordination of interpersonal movements,
the actions of one agent can serve as predictors for the expected
actions of the other agent [7]. Neri, Luu, and Levy [1] have indeed
demonstrated that in the context of interacting activities requiring
close-body contact such as fighting or dancing, the actions of one
agent can be used to guide the processing of the actions performed
by the other agent. Participants observed point-light displays of two
fighters masked with noise dots scattered all over the screen. Visual
detection of the target agent was better when the agent was
embedded in a fighting sequence with the second agent acting
synchronously as opposed to asynchronously, even though syn-
chronization was irrelevant to the visual discrimination task. These
findings suggest that implicit knowledge about the natural dynamics
of human interaction guides the processing of motion patterns
generated by the actions of individual agents. Because the actions of
the two agents are dynamically coupled, the action of one agent can
be used to predict the action of the other agent.In the presentstudy,
we investigated whether interpersonal predictive coding extends to
interactive activities in which no physical contingency is implied
between the movements of the interacting individuals.
A paradigmatic case of social interaction in which the
performance of the action of one agent is not physically contingent
upon the performance of the partner’s action is communicative
interaction. Consider the case of human pointing. Agent A points
towards an object. Agent B turns her head to look at the object. It
is only because we attribute to A the communicative intention to
affect B’s behaviour – for example, to inform B about the location
of a certain object - that we expect A’s action to be followed by B’s
response. The linkage between actions of the two agents is purely
intentional [8–10] and only makes sense against the background of
reciprocal communicative intention recognition [11].
In the present study we employed point-light displays to
investigate whether communicative interaction influences visual
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detection task. Participants observed point-light displays of two
agents (A and B) performing separate actions. In the communi-
cative condition, the action performed by agent B (e.g., bend over
to pick up something) responded to a communicative gesture
performed by agent A (e.g., pointing to the object). In the
individual condition, agent A’s communicative action was
substituted with a non-communicative, unrelated action (e.g.,
jumping). We hypothesized that if information picked up from
communicative interaction is used to predict the partner’s
response, then observing A’s communicative gesture should
enhance visual discrimination of agent B.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 23 undergraduate psychology students from
the University of Leuven (5 male and 18 female, mean age =21.1
years). They received course credits for their participation. All had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had provided informed
written consent, and were naı ¨ve with respect to the purpose of the
study. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the
Faculty of Psychology of the University of Leuven and was
conducted in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in
the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of two point-light figures, each consisting of 13
markers indicating the centre of the major joints of the actor (head,
shoulders, elbows, wrists, hips, knees, and feet). Ten point-light
stimuli were employed, five belonging to the communicative condition,
five belonging to the individual condition. Stimuli for the communicative
condition displayed a communicative interaction between two
agents, with agent A performing a communicative gesture towards
a second agent (B), who responded accordingly (e.g., A asks B to
squat down, B squats down). Stimuli for the communicative
condition were selected from the Communicative Interaction
Database (CID, [12]), and included: ‘Get down’, ‘Pick it up’, ‘Look
at that ceiling’, ‘Help yourself’, and ‘Sit down’. Stimuli for the
individual condition were created by substituting agent A’s commu-
nicative action with a non-communicative action with the same
onset and duration (‘Turn’, ‘Jump’, ‘Sneeze’, ‘Lateral step’,
‘Drink’). In both the communicative and the individual conditions,
the action by agent B (e.g., ‘picking something up’) was always
coupled with a fixed action by agent A (‘pointing to something to
be picked up’ in the communicative condition; ‘jumping’ in the
individual condition).
Stimuli were constructed in accordance with the motion capture
procedures described in detail by Dekeyser, Verfaillie, and Vanrie
[13]. For the communicative condition, the actions of the two
actors were captured at the same time, in order to guarantee that
B’s response matched A’s communicative gesture in all respects
(e.g., timing, position, and kinematics). The distance between A
and B during stimulus acquisition was about two meters. A and B
were always visible but the onset of A’s action always preceded
that of B. For the individual condition, A’s action was captured
while the actor was acting alone, and was then coupled with B’s
action, so as to maintain the same temporal structure as in the
communicative interaction (i.e., A’s action had the same onset and
duration as in the communicative condition). Stimulus duration
ranged from 3600 to 8200 ms (duration of A’s actions ranged
approximately from 2000 to 2600 ms; duration of B’s actions
ranged approximately from 2200 to 6700 ms). In both the
communicative and the individual conditions, agent A and agent
B remained approximately at a constant distance from the centre
of the screen for the whole duration of the action and never
physically touched one another. In all action stimuli (in both the
individual and in the communicative conditions), they always
faced each other.
Recognisability of the selected stimuli. In order to assess
the efficacy of stimuli included in the Communicative Interaction
Database, Manera and colleagues [12] examined how well each
stimulus was spontaneously recogni z e d .C o m m u n i c a t i v es t i m u l ia n d
non-communicative control stimuli showing two agents acting
independently of each other were presented to 54 naive observers.
Participants were asked, first, to decide whether the two agents (A and
B) were communicating or acting independently of each other and,
second, to provide a short description of the actions of both agents.
Results revealed that, on average, the stimuli were correctly
recognized as communicative by more than 85% of the partici-
pants; the communicative gesture of the action stimuli was correctly
identified by more than 64% of the participants. For the stimuli
included in the present study, the percentage of participants who
correctly classified the action stimuli as communicative varied from
72% (‘Help yourself’) to 96% (‘Get down’). The percentage of
participants who also correctly identified the specific communicative
gesture ranged from 37% (‘Help yourself’) to 93% (‘Get down’).
Control individual stimuli included in the present study were rarely
classified as communicative. The percentage of participants who
erroneously classified the individual stimuli as communicative varied
from 23% (‘Sneeze’) to 0% (‘Jump’). The percentage of participants
who correctly identified the specific individual gesture ranged from
72% (‘Sneeze’) to 98% (‘Jump’).
Apparatus and procedure
Stimuli were displayed on a 21 inch CRT monitor (refresh rate
=120 Hz) using MatLab (7.1 version) software. Viewing distance
was 57 cm. Dots (subtending approximately 0.14 deg each) were
black against a grey background and were rendered from a three-
quarter view (corresponding to the 125u reference orientation used
in the CID). The visual angle between the points attached to the
head and the feet was about 7.15 deg. Participants were tested
individually in a dimly lit and sound attenuated room.
A two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigm was employed.
Each trial consisted of two intervals, a target interval (containing
agent B) and a nontarget interval (not containing agent B), with a
500 ms fixation cross (black against a grey background) in between.
In the target interval, B’s actions were displayed using the limited
lifetimetechnique and masked withlimitedlifetimenoisedots[1,12]
(see Figure 1). The limited lifetime technique was used to prevent
observers from using local motion or position cues to perform the
task [14]. Indeed, when dots are always visible in the same location
on the actors’ body, it is easier for observers to rely on local cues.
The limited lifetime stimulus requires more global visual processing
[1,15]. Each signal dot was presented for a fixed duration (200 ms)
at one of the 13 possible locations, then disappeared, and
reappeared at another randomly chosen location. Six signal dots
per frame were shown. Dot appearance and disappearance were
asynchronous across frames in order to avoid motion transients
from simultaneous transitions of all sampling dots. Noise dots had
the same trajectories, size, and duration as the signal dots, but were
temporally and spatially scrambled (they appeared in an area
subtending approximately a 8.6u614.3u region). The number of
noise dots was adjusted individually for each participant during a
training session (see below).
In the nontarget interval, agent B was substituted by limited
lifetime scrambled dots obtained by temporally scrambling the
corresponding signal action. Noise dots were also added so as to
Communication and Point-Light
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On average, positions and motions of the dots in the nontarget
interval equaled those of the target interval (see also [1]). In both
the target and the nontarget intervals, A was neither limited
lifetime nor masked.
Observers were asked to decide which interval contained agent
B as opposed to no agent. Responses were given by pressing one of
two keys on a keyboard. Each participant completed four blocks of
25 trials (10 repetitions of five actions in two conditions). Each
block consisted of trials of both conditions presented in a
randomized order. Blocks lasted approximately seven minutes
each and were separated by a rest period of two minutes. Accuracy
feedback was given after each block.
Training session. Stimuli consisted in five actions performed by
a single agent, masked with five levels of noise (5, 15, 25, 35, or 45 noise
dots). The actions were different from those used in the experiment.
Actions were selected from the CID and included ‘raising arms’, ‘doing
aerobics’, ‘picking something up’, ‘standing up’, and ‘turning’.
Each participant completed two blocks of 25 trials (five actions
by five noise levels and by two repetitions). Trials in each block
were presented in a randomized order. Individual noise levels were
determined by fitting a cumulative Gaussian function to the
proportion of correct responses and determining the 75%
threshold. The minimum noise level allowed was five noise dots
(M=22.4, SD=17.3).
Results
The mean proportion of correct responses was .80 (score
range=.60 – .93), suggesting that the threshold estimate
calculated in the training session was sufficiently accurate for
most of the participants. The best detected action was ‘‘Sit down’’
(M=.85; SD=.14), followed by ‘‘Help yourself’’ (M=.82;
SD=.10), ‘‘Get down’’ (M=.80; SD=.14) and ‘‘Look at that
ceiling’’ (M=.77; SD=.13); ‘‘Pick it up’’ was the worst detected
action (M=.74; SD=.12). Differences in the proportion of correct
responses among the five action-stimuli reached statistical
significance (within-subject ANOVA F(1,22)=4.09, p=.004).
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that ‘Pick it up’ was detected
significantly worse than ‘Help yourself’ (p=.024) and ‘Sit down’
(p=.028). Action detection was not related to action-stimulus
duration (number of frames, r(3)=.26, p=.67). In line with data
concerning detection of agent’s B action presented in isolation
(Manera, Becchio, Del Giudice, Bara, & Verfaillie, unpublished
data), these findings suggest that, independently from the context
(communicative vs. individual) in which they were displayed, some
actions of agent B were easier to be detected than others.
In order to compare participants’ performance in the two
experimental conditions, criterion (c) and sensitivity (d’) parameters
were extracted [16]. For each participant we calculated the
proportion of hits (arbitrarily defined as ‘‘first interval’’ responses
when the target was in the first interval) and false alarms (‘‘first
interval’’ responses when the target was in the second interval) in
the two experimental conditions. Proportions of 0 were replaced
with 0.5/N, and proportions of 1 were replaced with (N-0.5)/N
(where N is the number of ‘‘first interval’’ and ‘‘second interval’’
trials).
Criterion values ranged from 2.58 to .58 (M=.00, SD=.29) for
the communicative condition and from 2.40 to .53 (M=.03,
SD=.21) for the individual condition. In neither the communi-
Figure 1. Example of a communicative signal trial. Agent A points to an object to be picked up; agent B bends down and picks it up. B was
presented using limited-lifetime technique (6 signal dots) and masked with temporally scrambled noise dots. The noise level displayed is the
minimum allowed in the experiment (5 noise dots). To provide a static depiction of the animated sequence, dots extracted from 3 different frames are
superimposed and simultaneously represented; the silhouette depicting the human form was not visible in the stimulus display.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014594.g001
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sample T-test: communicative condition, t=2.02; p=.983;
individual condition, t=.60; p=.553), thus suggesting that
participants’ responses were unbiased (i.e., there was no systematic
tendency to respond ‘first interval’ or ‘second interval’). No
difference in criterion between conditions was found (F(1,22)=.20;
p=.661).
Sensitivity values ranged from .52 to 2.23 (M=1.40; SD=.56)
in the communicative condition and from .22 to 2.15 (M=1.15;
SD=.45) in the individual condition (see Figure 2). A repeated-
measures ANOVA with condition (communicative vs. individual)
as within-subjects factor revealed a significant effect of condition
(F(1,22)=9.61; p=.005), with a higher sensitivity for the commu-
nicative condition compared to the individual condition.
To explore the role of interpersonal predictive coding further,
we verified whether enhanced visual discrimination of agent B for
the communicative condition was related to the recognisability of
agent’s A communicative gesture. If agent’s A communicative
gesture is used to predict B’s action, then better recognition of
agent’s A gesture should yield better visual detection performance.
To test this hypothesis, we took normative data collected to assess
the recognisability of each communicative gesture (the percentage
of naive participants who correctly described each gesture as
communicative in Manera et al. [12]; see Methods section) and
correlated this recognition index with the difference in sensitivity
between the communicative and the individual condition.
Recognisability of the communicative gesture performed by agent
A was found to be strongly correlated with the difference between
conditions (r(3)=.891; p=.042), as shown in Figure 3.
Discussion
Predictive coding allows humans to predict what the other
person will do next [4]. In the present study we examined whether,
in the context of a communicative interaction, the actions of one
agent can be used to predict the actions of a second agent. We
demonstrated that observing the communicative gesture per-
formed by one agent (A) indeed enhances visual discrimination of
the respondent (B) action.
How might the communicative gesture by the first agent
facilitate visual discrimination of the second agent? Each action by
agent B (e.g., ‘sitting down’) was always coupled with a fixed action
by agent A in both the communicative (‘inviting B to sit down’)
and individual (‘drinking’) condition. The associative strength
between the action of agent A and the action of agent B was
therefore identical in the two conditions. If facilitation simply
reflected associative learning, both conditions should be equally
affected by the observation of the action of the first agent and no
difference should be observed. Similarly, because in both the
communicative and the individual conditions the actions of the
two agents were time-locked so that the onset of agent A’s action
always preceded the onset of agent B’s action, we ruled out the
possibility that our findings simply reflect onset synchronization.
Clearly, observers were not only sensitive to the co-occurrence of
actions, but also to the intentional link binding the actions of the
two agents.
When presented with point-light displays of body movements,
people can evaluate not only the kind of actions performed [17,18]
and the associated emotions [19–22], but also the actor’s
expectations [23] and intentions [24,25]. Critically, information
in point-light displays has been shown to be sufficient for clear
recognition of an action as communicative, as well as for
identification of the specific communicative intent in performing
the action [12]. One possibility is thus that identification of agent
A’s communicative intent facilitated visual discrimination of a
second agent by allowing observers to predict B’s gesture. This
interpretation is supported by the finding that visual detection
performance correlated with the recognisability of A’s communi-
cative gesture: the better recognition of agent A’s communicative
gesture, the better visual discrimination of agent B.
An alternative explanation of the communicative versus indivi-
dual effect could be that, compared to individual actions,
communicative actions were more effective in triggering the
participants’ attention towards the action of action B. Although
this consideration is plausible in general [e.g., 26,27], in our
opinion it is unlikely that in the present study attentional orienting
led to enhanced detection performance in the communicative
condition. First, because the distance between agent A and agent B
was equated in the communicative and in the individual condition,
we eliminated the possibility that the communicative versus
individual effect depends on the visual area participants had to
keep in the focus of attention. Second, because agent A always
faced agent B in both the communicative and the individual
conditions, we ruled out the possibility that the reported effect is
related to facing. It might be objected that despite the fact that
distance and facing were the same across conditions, the gesture
orientation of agent A led to enhanced discrimination perfor-
mance in the communicative condition. However, if this were the
case, better visual discrimination of agent B should be observed for
Figure 2. Sensitivity (d’) in the two experimental conditions.
Error bars represents 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014594.g002
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attention toward a specific location in space, such us pointing
gestures [28]. In contrast, no difference between the communica-
tive and individual conditions was found for the action ‘Pick it up’
(see Figure 1 and 3), consisting of a pointing gesture toward the
ground, close to agent B’s foot. Furthermore, although the actions
performed by agent A in ‘Help yourself’ and ‘Sit down’ are similar
in driving visual attention toward the location of agent B (and of
the invisible objects), enhanced visual discrimination in the
communicative condition was observed for ‘Sit down’, but not
for ‘Help yourself’. Because ‘Sit down’ is better recognized than
‘Help yourself’, this suggests that enhanced discrimination
performance in the communicative condition was not due to
attentional orienting per se, but to the recognition of agent A’ s
communicative intention.
The finding that communicative interactions improve visual
detection of biological motion complements and extends previous
evidence for interpersonal predictive coding [1], suggesting that
the communicative gestures of one agent can serve as a predictor
for the expected actions of the respondent. Future studies, using
different approaches, will be necessary to understand the cognitive
and neural processes underlying this phenomenon. First, func-
tional MRI studies may help to shed light on the neural networks
underpinning the facilitation effect found in the communicative
condition. If visual discrimination benefits from intentional
processing of A’s communicative gesture – as we hypothesize
here – contrasting visual discrimination in the communicative and
the individual conditions should reveal differential activation in
regions associated the processing of communicative intentions
[29,30]. Second, neuropsychological studies (e.g., in populations
with autism spectrum disorder) might help to clarify whether
processing communicative intentions is necessary for facilitation
originating from information from the first agent. If our proposal is
correct, impaired encoding of intentions should disrupt facilitation
for communicative interactions, but not for physically-contingent
interactions such as fighting or dancing.
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